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Abstract:  We evaluate three policy reforms targeted at older unemployed people: (i) an 
hourly wage subsidy, (ii) an in-work credit, and (iii) a subsidy of social security contributions 
on low wages. The work incentive, labour supply and welfare effects of these hypothetical 
reforms are analysed on the basis a detailed micro-simulation model for Germany which 
includes a structural household labour supply model. We find that the simulated labour supply 
effects of the three policy reforms would be rather similar and of moderate size, ranging 
between 20,000 and 30,000 older women and between 10,000 and 20,000 older men. Our 
results also suggest that the hourly wage subsidy yields the highest welfare gains. 
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1 Introduction 
In several OECD countries, employment rates of older workers are low relative to average 
rates, and the incidence of long-term unemployment is relatively high among them. For 
example, in Germany almost two thirds of all unemployed people aged 55 – 64 years have 
been unemployed for more than a year, compared to roughly 40 percent in the total 
population. Only a few countries have comparable high long-term unemployment rates among 
older workers (OECD 2005a). Empirical analysis has shown that old-age is the single most 
important factor for long-term unemployment in Germany (Steiner 2001). Furthermore, 
employment rates of elderly men and women in Germany are also quite low, both in absolute 
terms and compared to most other OECD countries.  
Several reasons for the high level of long-term unemployment and low employment 
rates among elderly workers have been proposed both in the economics literature and the 
public policy debate (OECD 2005b). These include: age differences in employment protection 
regulations, contract wages set by collective bargaining agreements, negative work incentives 
related to high income replacement ratios and long entitlement periods to out-of-work 
benefits, or a combination of these factors. One important effect of age-related employment 
protection regulations and collective bargaining agreements may be on age-earnings profiles. 
In the presence of relatively steep age-earnings profiles, financial incentives to take up a low-
paying job for older unemployed people may be weak if the level of unemployment benefits 
is closely related to net earnings in the previous job. This is likely to be reinforced in the 
presence of extended unemployment-benefit entitlement periods which may be used as a 
bridge to early retirement by older workers. 
The mentioned reasons for the strong concentration of long-term unemployment among 
older workers may be of particular importance for Germany, since there are special 
regulations for elderly workers in the employment protection law, relatively steep age-
earnings profiles, and high income replacement ratios in the unemployment compensation and 
public pension systems. Recently there has been a change in policy perspective in Germany, 
following examples in other European countries, to reduce financial incentives for early 
retirement and to foster re-employment of elderly unemployed workers by various forms of 
wage subsidies targeted at this group. However, empirical evidence seems to show that 
participation in these programs is very limited, and their labour market effects are rather 
uncertain (see, e.g., OECD 2005a: chapter 5). This may be related to certain features of these 
programs, such as time limits and their interaction with the tax-benefit system. Therefore, it is 
of great interest to design and implement policies with the aim to increase incentives for this   2
group to participate in the labour market and thereby raise the level of employment among 
older workers.   
In this paper, we evaluate three policy reforms targeted at older unemployed people: (i) 
an hourly wage subsidy, (ii) an in-work credit, and (iii) a subsidy of social security 
contributions on low wages. The first reform proposal is similar to the Earnings Insurance 
scheme (Entgeltsicherung) recently introduced in Germany, the second and third are 
structured similarly as programs already existing in, respectively, Britain and Belgium (see 
Blundell et al. 2000; Bargain et al. 2005). The work incentive, labour supply and welfare 
effects of these hypothetical reforms are analysed on the basis of a detailed micro-simulation 
model for Germany which includes a structural household labour supply model. We find that 
the simulated employment effects of the three policy reforms would be rather similar and of 
moderate size, ranging between 20,000 and 30,000 additionally employed older women and 
between 10,000 and 20,000 older men. Our results also suggest that the hourly wage subsidy 
yields the highest welfare gains. However, all three reforms would yield positive income and 
welfare effects for the eligible population and would be ’self-financing’ in the sense that 
induced increases in taxes and social security contributions would outweigh the fiscal costs of 
the reform under the assumption that the eligible population can be restricted to previously 
unemployed people.  
In the next section we provide important facts on labour market outcomes and some 
institutional background on the tax-benefit system and public policies targeted at elderly 
people in Germany which motivate the three policy reform proposals presented in section 3. 
The empirical methodology on the basis of which we analyse the work incentive, labour 
supply of welfare effects of the three policy reforms is set out in section 4. Simulation results 
of these effects are summarized and discussed in section 4, welfare implications of the 
reforms are analysed in section 5, and section 6 concludes with some policy implications of 
these results.  
2  Empirical and Institutional Background 
We start with some stylised facts on labour market outcomes across age groups based on the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).
1 The data refer to the year 2003. The sample is 
restricted to individuals aged 25-64 to avoid distortions related to educational transitions and 
regular retirement, which are not analysed in this paper.  
                                                 
1   The SOEP is a representative sample of about 12,000 private households living in Germany with detailed 
information on household incomes, hours worked and household structure; for a detailed description, see 
Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).   3
As already mentioned in the introduction, the incidence of long-term unemployment 
among older people is very high in Germany. Table 1 shows this is especially true for older 
women of whom more than two thirds have already been unemployed for at least one year at 
the date of the interview. The share of long-term unemployed people among older men 
amounts to more than 50 percent, where there is little difference between those aged above 55 
years and unemployed people in the age group 45 to 54 years. Within this latter age group, 
there is also little difference in the share of long-term unemployment between men and 
women. 
Table 1.  Labour market outcomes by age and gender, 2003 
 
Share in % 
Share of  
long-term un- 













Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
25-34 20.68 18.54 31.53 31.06 59.37 73.45 20.92 34.52 31.75 41.75 
35-44 29.42 31.83 45.29 39.07 71.38 84.08 22.37 37.00 29.83 42.53 
45-54 26.32 25.53 52.27 53.09 71.91 84.32 22.86 36.81 30.85 42.56 
55-64 23.65 24.13 69.72 51.68 38.07 50.93 12.04 22.26 30.52 41.88 
Total 100.00  100.00  50.09 44.22 61.16 74.17 19.76 32.94 30.63 42.29 
Notes:    
−  Numbers in the table are grossed-up figures calculated using the cross-section SOEP weighting factors. 
−  Long-term unemployment refers to an interrupted duration of more than 12 months in May 2003. 
−  Working hours are hours per week, referring to either the whole population (unconditional) or to the working 
population (conditional).  
Source:  SOEP (2003), own calculations. 
    
Table 1 also reveals large differences in employment rates between age groups.  For both men 
and women, employment rates of people (including the self-employed) aged between 55 and 
64 years are low compared to other age groups. In particular, there is a huge difference in 
employment rates between the oldest age group and those aged between 45 and 54 years, both 
for men and women. These age differences in employment rates might be related to the 
widespread use of early retirement schemes in conjunction with the unemployment insurance 
system, as described below.  
For both men and women, the unconditional average working hours (including zero 
hours of non-employed people in the respective age group) also show a marked decline for 
the highest age group, which is mainly related to the low employment rates in this age group. 
Turning to the distribution of hours of workers only, Table 1 shows that conditional hours are 
relatively constant across age groups, both for women and men, and that employed men work 
substantially more hours than women in each age group.    4
Since employment rates for older workers are relatively low, looking only at the 
observed wages could bias the age profile of wages due to well-known selection-effects 
(Heckman 1979, Blundell et al., 2003). In Table 2, we therefore not only report observed 
wages of dependently employed workers but also for the total population; that is, the observed 
wages for the working and the expected wages for the non working population, where the 
latter are derived from selectivity-corrected wage regressions summarized in Table A1 in the 
appendix. 
Table 2.   Distribution of gross hourly wages by age and gender  
 Men  Women 
Age group  Mean  Median  25%-tile  Mean  Median  25%-tile 
  Employed workers only  
25-34 15.02  13.96  11.13  12.86  12.33  9.52 
35-44 19.08  17.14  13.48  14.43  13.33  10.20 
45-54 20.89  18.40  13.39  15.99  14.60  11.16 
55-64 21.83  18.65  13.28  15.69  13.60  9.92 
Total   19.16  16.71  12.78  14.74  13.41  10.20 
  All workers  
25-34 15.02  14.70  12.41  12.14  11.75  10.20 
35-44 18.01  17.87  14.63  13.76  13.35  11.52 
45-54 19.01  18.72  14.64  14.36  13.71  11.43 
55-64 16.80  15.66  12.36  12.91  12.29  10.39 
Total 17.37  16.84  13.46  13.32  12.86  10.87 
Notes:    
−  Wages are gross hourly wages, calculated by dividing monthly earnings by the number of monthly hours 
including over time; wages are grossed up figures using the cross-section SOEP weighting factors. 
−  Unconditional wages are derived on the basis of selectivity-corrected wage regressions, as described in the 
text. 
Source: SOEP (2003), own calculations. 
 
Comparing the average observed wages conditional on employment and the unconditional 
wages for the whole population, we find evidence for selection effects in the distribution of 
wages. For both men and women, mean hourly wages conditional on working exceed mean 
wages estimated for the whole population by more than 2 Euro, on average. Regarding age 
effects, the striking difference is that average wages for the working population are on 
average increasing with age, with hourly wages in the oldest age group exceeding the mean 
by roughly 3 Euro for men and about 1 Euro for women. Controlling selection effects, 
estimated hourly wages for both older men and women are very close to the average wage in 
the male and female population, although there is a significant wage reduction relative to the   5
hourly wage estimated for the age group 45 – 54 years.  Regarding the low-wage sector (25%-
tile), the hourly wage in the oldest age group is only slightly above the average wage in the 
total population, and there is also only a relatively small wage reduction relative to the age 
group 45 – 54 years.  
How can age differences in labour market outcomes described above be related to 
institutional regulations concerning elderly people? One important factor contributing to long-
term unemployment among older people might be  employment protection regulation. In 
Germany, the Protection Against Dismissal Act (‘Kündigungsschutzgesetz’) provides general 
rules for the termination of employment contracts by the employer as well as special 
regulations for particular groups of employees, especially elderly workers. The impact of 
employment protection regulations depends on the degree of wage flexibility. If wages are 
fully flexible under competitive conditions, higher employment protection costs for older 
workers would be compensated for by lower market wages. However, downward wage 
flexibility seems to be rather limited for older workers in Germany, as shown above. One 
reason for this stylised fact may be the widespread existence of collective bargaining 
agreements setting both entry wages as well as wage increases.  
Another reason for long-term unemployment and insufficient wage flexibility among 
older workers in Germany may be related to the unemployment compensation system which 
consists of a short-term contributory benefit  (Unemployment Benefit I, UB I ) and a longer 
term means-tested benefit (Unemployment Benefit II, UB II). UB I is an insurance payment 
set at 60% of previous net earned income for childless recipients and 67% for those with at 
least one child. It is granted for a limited period of time. Until recently, the entitlement period 
for UB I ranged from 12 up to 32 months, depending on an individual’s age and social 
security contribution record. Recent legislation, which has become effective at the beginning 
of 2006, has shortened the entitlement period to 12 months generally and to 18 months for all 
unemployed persons aged 55 or older. Since the reform of the unemployment compensation 
and social assistance systems in 2005, UB  II is available to those who are considered 
employable by the labour office or community welfare office and who are not eligible for 
UB I. It also contains additions for dependents, as well as contributions to statutory health 
insurance, long-term-care insurance and pension insurance. Those entitled to UB II also have 
access to advice and job placement. UB  II is set somewhat above the level of Social 
Assistance (SA) available to people deemed not employable. As both UB I and UB II as well 
as SA are means tested with transfer-withdrawal rates close to 100% even at very low 
earnings, work incentives hardly changed due to this reform.    6
One important institutional reason for the low employment rate among older workers is 
the prevalence of early retirement in Germany.
2 While the official retirement age is currently 
set at 65, the effective retirement age is substantially below this age. Until the year 1996 
insured persons were eligible for an old age pension without any specific deductions at the 
age of 60 if they were unemployed, had a minimum insurance record of at least 15 years and 
made contributions to the public pension scheme for at least 8 out of the last 10 years prior to 
retirement. Starting from 1997, the retirement age without deductions was gradually increased 
to age 65 by the year 2001. However, there still exists the opportunity to retire early, though 
the pension received is reduced by 3.6% for each year before the age of 65 the pension is 
taken. The age threshold for eligibility for an old age pension with deductions after being 
unemployed was age 60 until the end of the year 2005. It was raised to age 61 in 2006, 62 in 
2007, and 63 in 2008. After the year 2011, the specific regulations for the retirement age of 
the unemployed will be abolished completely. In the past, the attractiveness of early 
retirement following a period of unemployment was also due to a long entitlement period to 
unemployment benefits for the older unemployed. As described above, this has recently been 
changed, however. Moreover, persons at age 58 were allowed to receive unemployment 
benefits even if they stated that they did not want to take up a job. The specific regulation for 
unemployment benefits for those of age 58 and older will be abolished in 2008. 
In addition to these passive measures of labour market policy, there also exists a number 
of active policies targeted at elderly unemployed people. Of special importance for our 
analysis are  two such measures: 
The first is a wage subsidy named ‘Eingliederungszuschuss’ (EGZ) which is paid to 
firms employing elderly people (initially defined as 55 years or older, but subsequently 
reduced to the age of 50) covering both a share of the employees gross wage and the 
employers’ share of social security contributions (see OECD 2005a: 144). The duration and 
the amount of the subsidy are the highest for elderly people, amounting to a maximum of 70% 
of standardized wage costs for a period of up to 70 months (with reductions in the amount of 
the subsidy after 24 months). Neither the employer nor the employee is legally entitled to this 
subsidy, though, and part of it might have to be repaid if the employment relationship is 
terminated within a pre-specified period.. The EGZ, which was initially introduced at a 
temporary basis until the end of 2005 has meanwhile been extended until the end of 2007. 
The number of elderly people subsidised by EGZ has increased substantially over the last 
couple of years (see Ammermüller et al. 2006).  
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description, see OECD (2005a, Chapter 3, pp. 87ff.)   7
In 2003 a wage subsidy called Earnings Insurance (‘Entgeltsicherung’) was introduced. 
This subsidy, which was initially planned to expire at the end of 2005 but has subsequently 
been prolonged until the end of 2007, is intended to provide financial incentives for 
unemployed workers older than 50 to take up jobs with a wage below the level of the 
previously held job by way of a wage subsidy. The amount of this subsidy is 50% of the 
differential between the former salary and the net remuneration in the new job, the subsidy 
period depends on the previous entitlement period to UB I. Only a few people have 
participated in this programme so far (see Ammermüller et al., 2006).    
Although not explicitly targeted at older people, special regulations regarding subsidies 
to social security contributions paid on ‘marginal’ jobs may also be relevant for the 
employment of older workers. The so-called ’Mini Jobs’ reform made already existing special 
regulations somewhat more generous: the maximum hours restriction 15 hours per week) was 
abolished, the range of earnings completely exempted from employees’ social security 
contributions was expanded up to 400 Euro, with earnings between 401 and 800 Euro subject 
to a reduced contribution rate starting at 4 percent and increasing linearly up to the normal 
rate of 21 percent at the end of the bracket. However, for persons receiving unemployment or 
social assistance benefits, work incentives hardly changed due to this reform since earnings 
from mini-jobs are almost completely offset by benefit withdrawal due to the means tests 
applied to these transfers (see Steiner and Wrohlich 2005). 
3  Making Work Pay: Three Policy Reforms 
The preceding analysis suggests that specific regulations concerning elderly people and age-
related difference in labour market outcomes and the wage distribution are key for the 
employability of older people. These differences motivate policies targeted at elderly people 
aimed at improving their employability, as have already been implemented in various 
countries of the European Union. Here, we focus on three policy reforms: 
(i)  an hourly wage subsidy, 
(ii)  an in-work credit, and 
(iii)  a subsidy of social security contributions on low earnings in a full-time job. 
The first reform proposal is similar to the Earnings Insurance scheme recently introduced in 
Germany (see section 2), the second and third are structured similarly as programs already 
existing in, respectively, Britain and Belgium (see Blundell et al. 2000; Bargain and 
Orsini  2006). The main difference to these already existing programs is that all three 
proposals analysed here are targeted at unemployed older people. The main characteristics of 
these reforms are summarized in the following table.     8
Table 3.   Three making-work-pay policy reforms  
 
Reform 1 
Hourly Wage Subsidy 
Reform 2 
In-Work Credit 
Reform 3  
Employment Bonus 
Target group   unemployed, 
55 – 64 years 
unemployed, 
55 – 64 years 
unemployed, 
55 – 64 years 
Subsidy base  hourly wage  household income  individual earnings (full-
time equivalents) 
Amount of the subsidy 
difference between hourly 
wage in previous job and 
hypothetical market wage 
in new job 
7,100 Euro/year 
maximum; below 
household income of 
6,750 Euro/year benefit 
withdrawal rate = 0, 
above this threshold  the 
withdrawal rate = 37%;  
extra bonus of 990 
Euro/year for working 
hours > 30/week, also 
withdrawn at a rate of 
37%  
maximum monthly bonus 
of 215 Euro  withdrawn at 
a rate of 15% 
Earnings/income threshold  no  income <  6,750 Euro/year 1,500 Euro/month 
Minimum hours restriction  no  16 hours 
30 hours (bonus)  full-time, 40 hours 
Time limit  no, 65 years  no, 65 years  no, 65 years 
Source: Own  description. 
 
(i)  Hourly Wage Subsidy (HWS) 
The idea of the HWS is to provide financial incentives to unemployed elderly people to take 
up a low-paying job, relative to the wage earned in the previous job. This subsidy is meant to 
close the gap between the reservation wage and the market wage of older unemployed people. 
In contrast to the already existing Earnings Insurance mentioned above, the HWS is a subsidy 
on low hourly wages rather than earnings. Furthermore, the HWS is to be paid permanently 
(until retirement) rather than temporarily as in case of the already existing Earnings Insurance. 
The reason is that we would neither expect long-run employment effects from the latter, nor 
would it be possible to analyse the long-term effects of a time-limited programme on the basis 
of the empirical framework employed here.
3  
One fundamental problem in analysing such a programme is that the amount of the 
subsidy is not known a priori, because it would depend on the unobserved reservation wage of 
                                                 
3   If there are no long-term productivity effects from participating in the programme, for which there is no 
empirical evidence, there would be no long-term employment effect after the subsidy has expired because, 
assuming it was actually required to employ the eligible worker in the first place, the potential market wage  
would again fall short of the worker’s reservation wage.   9
the potential participant in the programme. In order to determine the wage subsidy we derive 
for each non-working individual in our sample two ‘counterfactual’ wages, the individual’s 
reservation wages and her or his expected market wage at the start of a new job. As described 
in section 2, these counterfactual wages are estimated on the basis of selectivity-corrected 
wage equations. Since marked differences between men and women as well as between east 
and west Germany persist, we have estimated the wage equations separately by gender and 
region (see Table A1 in the appendix). 
The explanatory variable in the wage equation of main interest for our analysis is firm 
tenure.
4  For the calculation of the wage subsidy we assume that an individual’s reservation 
wage depends on her or his last wage, and thus tenure in the previous job, whereas the market 
wage is set equal to the expected individual wage at zero tenure.  The difference between 
these two wages measures an individual’s earnings gap and determines the size of the HWS.
5  
In order to close the gap between the market and the reservation wage the market wage needs 
to be increased by about 15%, on average. As shown in Table A2 in the appendix, the average 
earnings gap varies between 5% for east German men and almost 25% for east German 
women, and also varies substantial with tenure within each group.  
(ii)  In-Work Credit (IWC) 
In several OECD countries in-work credits have been introduced both as an anti-poverty 
policy and as a measure to make work pay (OECD 2005b, Bargain and Orsini 2006). Most 
prominent examples are the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA and the Working (Family) 
Tax Credit in the UK (see, e.g., Hotz and Scholz 2003, Blundell et al. 2000, Haan and Myck 
2006). Whereas these in-work credits are typically targeted at poor families with children, the 
In-Work Credit (IWC) proposed here is conditioned on age and employment status. The target 
group of the IWC is the same as for the HWS, namely individuals aged between 55 and 64 
currently not working. The requirement for this group is to take up work for at least 16 hours 
per week. As eligibility to the IWC is based on household income, for couples it is sufficient 
that one spouse fulfils the relevant criteria.  
The proposed IWC is designed as follows:  Up to a yearly gross household income 
of 6,750 Euro households receive the maximum credit of 7,100 Euro, above this level the 
                                                 
4    For the working population this information is explicitly collected in the data. For the non-working 
population we had to construct this information from their job histories available in the SOEP. Since we do 
not observe job-to- job changes in the data, our estimate of the tenure variable has to be interpreted as an 
upper bound. 
5   The wage subsidy differs between individuals not only due to the distribution of the assumed tenure, but also 
due to the impact of other individual specific factors on the reservation and market wage, such as human 
capital, gender, region or nationality.   10
credit is withdrawn at a rate of 37%. Gross income includes income from dependent work, 
self employment and pensions. For full time work, more than 30 hour per week, households 
receive an extra annual bonus of  990 Euro, which is also withdrawn at a rate of 37%. As we 
show in section 4.1 below, the IWC is particularly attractive for single households with low 
earnings potential, whereas the modest income threshold makes this programme less relevant 
for couple households when at least one of the spouses is already working.  
(iii)  Employment Bonus (EB) 
The design of this programme follows a similar one existing in Belgium under the name 
Employment Bonus (see Bargain et al. 2005), with the main difference being that here 
eligibility again is conditioned on age and an individual’s employment status. The EB differs 
from the IWC as it is based on individual wages rather than household income and subsidises 
the employee’s social security contributions which amount to roughly 20% in Germany. The 
EB also differs from the existing subsidy of so-called ‘mini-jobs’ which are completely or 
partly exempted from employees’ social security contributions, as described in section 2.2 
above. On the top of this subsidy, the EB introduces a maximum bonus of 215 Euro per 
month for eligible persons working full time with an earnings threshold of 1,500 Euro per 
month. This guarantees that only low-wage people receive the subsidy and distinguishes the 
EB from the HWS for which all currently non-working individuals in the relevant age group 
are eligible regardless of their hourly wage. Hence, the EB provides stronger incentives for 
low-skilled older unemployed people. 
4 Empirical  Methodology 
To analyse the effects of the three reform proposals described in the previous section on work 
incentives and household labour supply we use our behavioural micro-simulation model 
STSM.
6  The model is based on the SOEP and basically consists of two parts:  a tax-benefit 
calculator that computes net household incomes for each sample household on the basis of 
information on gross incomes, and for different (hypothetical) legislations and different 
working hours of individuals; and an empirical labour supply model with household utility 
depending on net household income and leisure of both spouses (in case of couple 
households). On the basis of this model we can analyse changes in work incentives and labour 
supply effects under different reform scenarios and perform welfare analyses of these reforms.   
                                                 
6   For a detailed description of the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model STSM, see Steiner et al. (2005).   11
The household labour supply model is specified as a discrete choice model on the 
assumption that a household can choose among a finite number J+1 of working hours 
categories (J positive hours categories and non-employment); each hour category, j=0,…,J, 
corresponds to a given level of disposable income Cij and each discrete bundle of leisure and 
income provides a different level of utility (see, e.g., van Soest 1995). The utility Vij derived 
by household i from making choice j is assumed to depend on a utility function U of the wife's 
leisure, Lfij, the husband’s leisure, Lmij, the household’s disposable income, Cij, household 
characteristics Zi, and on a random term εij:  
( ) ,, , ij ij ij ij i ij VU L f L m C Z ε =+  
If the error term εij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across 
alternatives and households according to the Extreme-Value type I (EVI) distribution, the 
probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by the Multinomial Logit 
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The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and 
maximised to estimate the parameters of the utility function U. We assume a quadratic 
specification of the utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000). For a couples household, the 
systematic part of the utility function is thus given by:   
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Preferences are allowed to vary across households through taste shifters on linear income and 
leisure coefficients: 

















where X1, X2, X3 are column vectors including age, number and age of children, disability 
indicators, and region of residence., and the α’s are (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated 
jointly with the remaining β coefficients given in the utility function above. In the estimation 
we do not consider potential effects of unobserved heterogeneity, which implies that the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property is assumed to hold. However, Haan   12
(2006) has shown that labour supply elasticities, estimated on the same data as in the present 
study, do not differ significantly when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. 
The model is estimated separately for couple households with both spouses’ labour 
supply assumed to be flexible (3931 households), for couples with only one spouse’s labour 
supply flexible (1609), and for single households (1043 single women and 796 single men). 
The utility function and the derivation of the choice probabilities of single household are 
analogous to the case of a couples household, except that the utility function contains only 
one leisure term for the respective individual. We estimate the model separately for single 
men, single women and couple households on a restricted sample of households with at least 
one adult is aged between 20 and 64, not in education and not self-employed. We specify 6 
hours categories according to the actual distribution of hours in the sample: non-employment, 
three part-time categories, full-time and overtime work. The distribution of hours for the 
various groups of households is given in Table A3 in the appendix. 
The dataset used for estimating the labour supply model is the SOEP 2003 with 
information on household incomes for fiscal year 2002. We use the estimated empirical 
household labour supply model to simulate the probabilities of choosing each hours category 
for every household under the fiscal system 2005 (status quo scenario simulated under the 
assumption that the preferences for leisure and disposable income have not changed between 
2002 and 2005) and the policy reform of interest. The difference in the simulated distributions 
of hours categories between the status quo scenario and a particular policy reform yields the 
labour supply effects of the respective reform.  
In our non-linear model labour supply effects need to be derived numerically. Instead of 
the ‘aggregated frequencies’ technique, that is aggregating the expected individual hour 
supply over the whole sample, we follow the calibration method which is consistent with the 
probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level (Creedy and Duncan 2002). It consists 
of drawing for each household a set of J+1 random terms from the EVI distribution until a 
vector of random terms is found  that generates a perfect match between predicted and 
observed hour supply. In a second step, the draws are used for predicting labour supply 
responses to a tax reform, and averaging them over a large number of draws provides robust 
transition matrices. 
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5  How Would the Reforms Affect Work Incentives and Labour Supply? 
5.1  Work incentives: effects of the reforms on household budget constraints 
To assess the work incentive effects of the three policy reforms, in the following we present 
their impacts on the budget constraints of several stylised households which qualify for the 
transfer programmes derived on the basis of the tax-benefit micro-simulation model STSM 
for fiscal year 2005.  
Figure 1a shows the effects of the three reforms on the budget constraint of a single 
person with a relatively low expected hourly wage, which we have set equal to the 25%-tile of 
the wage observed for men in our sample; this person is assumed to be eligible to means-
tested income support, such as unemployment compensation (see section 2). For employment 
exceeding 16 hours per week the IWC would lead to a relatively strong increase in net 
household income (by roughly 280 Euro). Although withdrawn at a rate of 37%, the amount 
of the IWC is still significant even when working full-time, which is partly due to the full 
time bonus at 30 hours. Comparing the EB and the HWS, there is very little difference in their 
effects on net household incomes. In both cases, net household incomes would only differ 
from the status quo at higher levels of working hours, i.e. beyond  the subsidy range for 
‘Mini-Jobs’. Looking at the same type of household but assuming that he or she is not eligible 
to means tested income support,  Figure 1b shows basically the same picture regarding the 
financial incentives induced by the three reforms as described above, except for the obvious 
difference that taking up a low-wage job may become financially attractive even at low hours. 
For couple households the effects of the reforms on budget constraints are different as 
the household context needs to be considered. This is particularly important for the IWC. 
Figure 1c illustrates the case with one spouse working at a modest wage of 12.9 Euro (25th 
percentile male wage) per hour. Again, we observe relative high out of work benefits and 
therefore a modest impact of the reforms. At assumed hourly wages (see note to the figure), 
both HWS and EB affect net household incomes in case of more than 30 working hours per 
week. In contrast, the IWC increases net household income substantially after the 16 hours 
weekly minimum working requirement is met and further increases after 30 hours due to extra 
bonus.  
For two-earner couples households with one spouse working full time the amount of the 
tax credit is very small (Figure 1d). However, both individual based subsidies significantly 
affect the household budget constraint. For this household we have assumed that both spouses 
are eligible for the HWS and the EB. Therefore, the non working income of the second spouse 
is higher in the reform scenarios than in the actual 2005 system.   14
Figure 1.  Budget constraints under the status quo and alternative reforms 
 






















































































Figure 1.  Continued 
 
Notes:   
−  Single household working at 25th percentile hourly wage of men aged 55-64 (12.36 Euro), no children. 
−  Couple household, one spouse working at 25th percentile hourly wage of men, no children.   
−  Couple household, both spouse working, the husband works 40 hours at 25th percentile hourly wage of men 
aged 55-64 (12.36 Euro), the wife works full-time at the respective 25th percentile hourly wage (10,39 Euro). 
Source:  authors’ calculations using STSM 
 























































































5.2  Labour supply effects 
In order to evaluate the labour supply effects of the three policy reforms we simulate for each 
household in our sample the change in the level of net household incomes implied by each of 
the three reforms based on STSM, and then estimate the labour supply effects induced by 
these income changes, as described section 4.   
In Table 4 we summarize grossed-up simulation results for the three policy reforms. In 
addition to the effects of the reforms on labour force participation, we also calculate their 
impact on working hours. The hours effects are decomposed by previous labour market status 
into changes for the new participants and for the working population, calculated as full-time 
equivalents assuming 40 weekly working hours. Table A2 in the appendix summarizes the 
labour force participation and hours effects of the three reforms relative to, respectively, the 
non-working and working population aged between 55 and 64 years.  
The overall labour supply effects of the three scenarios are moderate and of similar size. 
Note, however, that the reform only affects households with at least one unemployed adult 
aged between 55 and 64. For women the effects range between roughly 20,000 and 30,000 
new participants. For men, the effects are smaller, about 13,000 for the IWC, slightly higher 
for the EB, and about 24,000 for the HWS. Relative to the non working population the labour 
supply effects for men range between 1.7% and 3.4%. These numbers outweigh the relative 
effects for women as the non working female population is larger. By definition the contrary 
is true for the effects relative to the working population (see Table A4).  
Labour supply effects differ by gender and between singles and couples households due 
to the design of the programmes. As mentioned above, both the EB and the HWS are 
conditioned on individual rather than household incomes. Therefore, for these programs we 
do not find the small or even negative participation effects for couple households as in the 
case of the IWC. Whereas the latter provides negative disincentives for the second earner in 
couple households, for couples with both spouses working there are positive incentive for 
labour supply behaviour. We estimate an overall small positive participation effect of the 
IWC for women living in couples households.  
For single households, the IWC has a stronger positive effect than the HWS and the EB. 
This is due to the above mentioned generosity of the IWC for single households over a large 
part of the hours distribution. Comparing the labour supply effect of the HWS with the EB, 
we find slightly higher effects for the wage subsidy. This is not surprising as the HWS is not 
conditioned on household income or dependent on some income threshold, as the other two 
programmes are.    17
Table 4.  Labour supply effects of the policy reforms (absolute numbers in 1,000 persons) 
Women Men 
Working hours as full time  
equivalents 
Working hours as full time  
equivalents   
New 
Participation










HWS          
Couples 21  19  18  1  18  20  20  0 
  (11 - 31)  (9 - 27)  (10 - 26)  (-1 - 2)  (15 - 22)  (16 - 24) (16 - 24)  (0) 
Singles 6  6  6  0  6  6  6  0 
  (2 -10)  (2 - 9)  (2 - 9)    (4 - 8)  (4 - 8)  (4 - 8)  (0) 
Total 27  25  24 1 24  26  26 0 
  (13 - 41)  (11 - 36)  (12 - 35)  (-1 - 2)  (18 - 29)  (20 - 32) (21- 32)  (0) 
IWC          
Couples 10  5  6  -1  -1  -2  0  -2 
  (6 -13)  (3 - 7)  (4 - 8)  (-1 - -1)  (-3 - 0)  (-4 - -1) (-1 - 1)  (-3 - -2) 
Singles 12  8  8  0  14  12  12  0 
  (7 - 17)  (4 - 11)  (4 - 11)    (9 - 17)  (8 - 15)  (8 - 15)  (0) 
Total 22  13  14  -1 13  10  12  -2 
  (12 - 30)  (7 - 19)  (8 - 18)  (-2 - -1)  (6 - 17)  (5 - 15)  (8 - 17)  (-3 - -2) 
EB          
Couples 16  14  13  1  9  10  9  1 
  (10 - 21)  (8 - 19)  (8 - 17)  (1 - 2)  (7 - 11)  (8 - 13)  (8 - 11)  (1 - 2) 
Singles 5  5  5  0  7  7  7  0 
  (2 - 7)  (2 - 6)  (2 - 6)    (4 - 8)  (5 - 9)  (5 - 9)  (0) 
Total 21  19  18 1 16  17  16 1 
  (12 - 28)  (10 - 25)  (9 - 23)  (1 - 2)  (12 - 19)  (13 - 22) (12 - 20)  (1) 
Notes:  
−  For definition of HWS, IWC and EB, see text;  
−  Full time equivalents are defined as 40 weekly working hours.  
−  Numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand; numbers in parentheses are bootstrapped 95% confidence 
bands based on 100 repetitions.  
Source: SOEP 2003;  calculations based on empirical household labour supply model as described in the text. 
 
The increase in working hours mainly results from previously unemployed people 
participating in the labour market due to the reforms. However, in couple households hours 
worked slightly decrease as the partner of the eligible spouse is also affected by the reform. In 
line with the design of the reforms, we find that new participants induced to enter the labour 
market by the HWS or the EB want to work full-time. The participation effects and the 
corresponding full time equivalents are of similar size. For the IWC, however, the results 
imply that the new participants tend to work part-time which is due to the withdrawal of the 
IWC with increasing gross earnings.    18
6  Welfare Implications  
In addition to the labour supply effects of the alternative policy reforms analysed in the 
previous section, their welfare implications are of interest for policy evaluation. In practical 
policy discussions, the welfare measure typically used simply is the average income gain (or 
loss) induced by the reform. A theoretically more appropriate welfare measure is based on the 
monetary equivalent of the average change in the level of utility induced by some reform. 
Following King (1981), we calculate the compensating variation (CV) as a monetary measure 
of the average change in welfare. CV is defined as the minimum amount by which a 
consumer (worker) would have to be compensated after a price (wage) change in order to be 
as well off as before. In the present context, the policy reforms analysed raise the relative 
wage for unemployed workers taking up a job. In this case, the compensating variation thus 
measures the average monetary amount eligible people would have to be given to make them 
equally well of if the policy reform had not been implemented. This measure has the 
advantage that, instead of simply comparing households gaining and losing in terms of 
household income, the utility loss associated with the reduced leisure of people induced to 
participate in the labour market due to the reform is accounted for in the calculation of the 
overall welfare gain of the reform.  
Table 5.  Average income and welfare effects of the reforms  
  HWS IWC  EB 












   Average effects for eligible households (in Euro per months) 
Couples  510 391 237 121 354 266 
Single  Women  534 333 359 202 279 129 
Single  Men  251  43 514 231 297  66 
  Aggregate effects (in 1000 Euro per year) 
Couples  189,832  145,340 17,042  8,712 80,712 60,648 
Single  Women  38,412 23,976 51,696 29,030 16,710  7,740 
Single  Men  18,072  3,082 86,419 38,875 24,931  5,502 
Total  246,316 172,398 155,158  76,618 122,353  73,890 
Notes:  
−  Average income and welfare effects are rounded to the nearest Euro, aggregate effects to the nearest 1,000 
Euro.  
−  The welfare effect is measured as compensating variation.  
Source: Simulation results based on STSM. 
 
Income and welfare effects of the three reforms for household directly affected by the reform 
are summarised in Table 5. In the upper part of the table we report these effects for eligible   19
households, i.e. those with at least one previously unemployed household member between 55 
and 64 years of age taking up a job. Average monthly income of eligible unemployed people 
increases substantially, on average, where income effects vary substantially both between the 
three reforms and by household type. For couples, the HWS is estimated to lead to an average 
monthly income gain of 510 Euro of previously unemployed older people living in couples 
households, compared to about 240 Euro for the IWC and 350 Euro for the EB, respectively. 
For single women, too, the largest average income gain is obtained for the HWS, whereas the 
IWC would result in a somewhat larger gain than the EB. In contrast, for single men the IWC 
would lead to the highest income gains, whereas the lowest gains would result for the HWS.   
In general, we find that the income effect exceeds the welfare effects.
7 This is because 
only previously unemployed older people who take up work become eligible to a subsidy 
under each of the three reforms and, given that leisure is a normal good, need to be 
compensated for their loss of leisure. As indicated by the relatively large difference in 
estimated income gains and welfare effects, this is particular true for single households, and 
single men in particular.  
The lower part of Table 5 summarizes aggregate income and welfare effects for the 
eligible population as a whole. Overall, the HWS would result in the strongest increase in 
both income and welfare amounting to roughly 250 and 170 million Euro per year, 
respectively. Aggregate income and welfare effects for the other two policy reforms would be 
substantially smaller, but still substantial. Net budgetary costs would be negative for all three 
reforms analysed here ranging from about 40 million Euro per year for the IWC to almost 200 
million Euro for the HWS. Depending on the way these induced tax receipts are distributed in 
the population, there could be second-order effects modifying simulated income and welfare 
gains for the three reforms. However, assuming that these additional funds are distributed as a 
lump-sum to all households, these effects would be minimal. 
 
                                                 
7   Welfare effects are usually analysed under the assumption of budgetary balance, where the net costs of a 
specific programme are financed by a lump sum tax. Accounting for behavioural effects, net costs turned out 
to differ between the three policies analysed but are negative in each case. Since a lump sum transfer 
distributing the resulting surplus would amount to less than 1 Euro per month, and thus not make any 
difference to the numbers shown in table, we neglect this issue here.   
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7  Summary and Policy Conclusions  
The employment rate and the incidence of long-term unemployment are very high among 
older people in Germany, both in absolute terms and compared to most other OECD 
countries. We have shown that hourly wages of older workers still employed exceed the 
average wage in the working population by a large margin, especially in case of men, and that 
the age distribution of wages is strongly affected by selection effects regarding individual 
employment decisions. Controlling these effects, estimated hourly wages for both older men 
and women are very close to the average wage in the male and female population, although 
there is a significant wage reduction relative to the hourly wage estimated for the age group 
45 – 54 years. These estimates indicate that the relatively high wage level of  older workers is 
supported by their low employment rate which, in turn, is the result of older workers with 
relatively low earnings potential dropping out of the labour force. 
These age differences in labour market outcomes are likely to be related to institutional 
factors, such as the widespread use of early retirement schemes in conjunction with the 
unemployment insurance system. Recent reforms have, on the one hand, attempted to reduce 
financial incentives for long-term unemployment and early retirement, and implemented 
various wage subsidies targeted at long-term unemployed workers, on the other hand. These 
wage subsidies seem to have been not very success so far, which may be related to the 
insufficient coordination with other means-tested income support and the way they have been 
implemented, in particular insufficient targeting and relatively short time limits.  
In contrast to existing wage subsidies in Germany, the three policy reforms we have 
analysed in this paper – an hourly wage subsidy, an in-work tax credit, and the employment 
bonus – are not time limited, targeted at unemployed people above the age of 55 years, and 
restricted to regular employment. We find that the simulated employment effects of the three 
policy reforms would be rather similar and of moderate size, ranging between 20,000 and 
30,000 additionally employed older women and between 10,000 and 20,000 older men. 
Average monthly incomes of eligible previously unemployed people who take up work 
increase substantially, on average, where income effects vary substantially both between the 
three reforms and by household type. Our results also suggest that the hourly wage subsidy 
yields the highest welfare gains if measured at the individual (household) level using the 
compensating variation as monetary welfare measure. Since empirical labour supply 
elasticities differ between elderly men and women, and between single and couple 
households, the relative size of income and welfare effects varies between these groups as 
well as between programmes.   21
All three reforms analysed here would be self-financing in the sense that net budgetary 
costs are estimated to be negative, ranging from about 40 million Euro per year for the in-
work credit to almost 200 million Euro for the hourly wage subsidy.  This optimistic scenario 
depends on the possibility to restrict eligibility to any of the three subsidies to currently 
unemployed older people.  Thus, we have to assume that the actual implementation of such a 
policy measure would not induce currently employed older people to become unemployed 
and thereby eligible to the subsidy. It should be stressed that for the policy reforms analysed 
here such an entitlement effect seems more likely than under the already existing wage 
subsidies targeted at older unemployed people. The reason is that the subsidies analysed here 
are permanent rather than limited to a relatively brief time period. However, the time-limit of 
existing wage subsidies to older workers may also explain their very limited success: If there 
are no long-term productivity effects from participating in the programme, there would be no 
long-term employment effect after the subsidy has expired. One possibility would perhaps be 
to combine a time-limited wage subsidy and subsidized vocational training programmes, but 
there is little empirical evidence, both for Germany and in international comparison, that such 
programmes are effective for older workers.   22
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Appendix  
Table A1.   Selectivity-corrected wage regressions 
  Women west  Women east  Men west  Men east 
Wage equation                       
Years of education  0.061   34.01   0.020   8.22   0.055   44.52    0.034    14.91  
Years of full time work  0.008   3.22   -0.005   -2.31             
Years of full time work squared  -0.011   -1.62   -0.019   -3.99             
Years of part time work  -0.006   -2.01   -0.021   -9.04             
Years of part time work squared  0.022   1.71   0.026   2.70             
Age 25-34  -0.110   -5.58   -0.610   -14.06   -0.352   -27.12    -0.287    -12.57  
Age 35-44  0.026   1.55   -0.378   -9.84   -0.145   -17.71    -0.092    -6.46  
Age 45-54  0.085   6.36   -0.220   -7.31   -0.041   -5.31    -0.022    -1.58  
Age 55-64  0.057   5.27   -0.104   -4.82   -0.011   -1.49    0.004    0.30  
Tenure  0.004   1.43   0.017   10.65   0.010   5.71    0.003    2.31  
Tenure squared   0.002   0.19   -0.023   -4.77   -0.025   -4.28    -0.004    -1.07  
Human capital depreciation  -0.052   -7.19   -0.097   -13.36   -0.064   -6.98    -0.159    -18.49  
Years of education × German  0.000   0.16        0.005   5.24         
Years of full time work × German  0.004   1.61        -0.001   -0.58         
Yrs. full time work sq. × German  -0.015   -2.11        0.013   2.18         
Years of part time work × German  0.002   0.84        -0.083   -7.83         
Yrs. of part time work sq. × German  -0.016   -1.16                  
Tenure × German  0.010   3.46                  
Tenure squared × German  -0.019   -1.89                  
Human capital depreciation × German  0.009   1.13                  
Civil servant  0.028   8.29   0.007   0.91   -0.010   -3.93    0.018    2.72  
Selection equation                      
Age 25-34  1.983   45.20   3.354   29.80   -0.252   -7.63    0.057    1.02  
Age 35-44  2.317   63.27   3.494   37.29   0.773   28.27    0.993    21.87  
Age 45-54  1.859   56.65   2.746   37.13   1.051   35.00    1.132    23.90  
Age 55-64  1.239   44.63   1.690   32.13   1.047   37.48    1.061    25.86  
Medium education degree  0.190   5.97   1.071   14.24   0.207   5.46    1.013    11.13  
High education degree  0.513   16.54   1.422   20.27   0.234   6.89    1.245    16.35  
Vocational training  0.481   21.18   0.897   14.47   0.657   25.20    1.066    15.40  
Academic Education  1.082   34.96   1.979   25.37   1.093   31.85    1.832    21.64  
Years of full time work  0.116   41.41   0.150   24.64             
Years of full time work squared  -0.141   -18.84   -0.150   -11.10             
Years of part time work  0.146   40.20   0.130   17.97             
Years of part time work squared   -0.274   -19.52   -0.161   -5.58             
German   0.027   1.19        0.202   8.43         
Bad health (medium)  -0.004   -2.28   -0.011   -3.46   -0.012   -7.98    -0.015    -4.84  
Bad health (high)  -0.011   -4.85   -0.003   -0.74   -0.005   -2.65    -0.001    -0.26  
Married  -0.116   -6.09   0.302   9.55   0.330   15.32    0.715    20.61  
Child younger 3  -1.413   -43.22   -1.136   -17.80   0.023   0.61    -0.128    -1.84  
Child between 3-6  -0.612   -23.32   -0.303   -5.30   -0.019   -0.54    0.001    0.01  
Child between 7-16  -0.335   -17.10   -0.124   -3.54   0.027   1.12    0.039    1.02  
Child older 17  -0.061   -1.68   -0.111   -1.87   -0.072   -1.63    -0.096    -1.48  
Other household income/1000  -0.152   -27.80   -0.328   -22.02   -0.398   -65.55    -0.608    -36.14  
Mills ratio  0.055   5.81   -0.040   -2.59   0.003   0.57    -0.024    -1.81  
Number of observations                      
Censored   19287     6125     9890     4494      
Uncensored  17816      6990      24462      7556      
Notes:  
−  Two-stage estimation of selection model (Heckman 1979) on pooled data for the period 1995-2003.  
−  The variable human capital depreciation is a weighted sum of years of previous unemployment; a constant, time and 
regional dummies (at the state level) as well as dummies for industry and firm size are included in both equations. The 
sign “×” indicates an interaction term. 
−  For all groups the joint tenure effect is highly significant according to an F test of joint significance. 
Source: SOEP, waves 1995 – 2003.   24
Table A2.   Hourly wage subsidy and market wages  
   Women  Men 
      East West East West 
Eligible population  subsidy (Euro / hour)  1.86 1.54 0.38 1.63 
   in %  24.46  17.39  4.78  13.91 
   market wage (Euro / hour)  7.61 8.87 7.91  11.75 
By  tenure        
tenure = 0  market wage 8.01  8.10  7.91  13.89 
0 < tenure ≤ 10 years  subsidy (Euro / hour)  0.50 0.54 0.10 0.40 
   in %  6.11  6.20  1.08  3.40 
   market wage (Euro / hour)  8.14 8.78 9.07  11.73 
10 < tenure ≤ 20 years  subsidy (Euro / hour)  1.73 1.49 0.35 1.25 
   in %  21.99  16.45  3.72  10.91 
   market wage (Euro / hour)  7.86 9.08 9.29  11.51 
tenure > 20 years  subsidy (Euro / hour)  2.72 2.76 0.49 1.95 
   in %  37.35  30.32  6.45  16.77 
   market wage (Euro / hour)  7.28 9.10 7.55  11.62 
Tenure   (in months)  20.71  17.03  25.66  26.78 
Note:  The relative wage subsidy is calculated as ratio (in %) of the amount of the subsidy relative to the 
expected market wage. 
Source: SOEP 2003; own calculations based on wage regressions in Table A1. 
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Table A3.   Hours categories by household type 
 
Share Male Working Female Working
Hours Hours
1    3.84      0              0             
2    0.66      0              7.42        
3    0.79      0              17.71        
4    0.94      0              26.72        
5    2.72      0              34.88        
6    0.74      0              41.47        
7    0.25      5.47         0             
8    0.08      6.71         8.33        
9    0.05      5.52         17.00        
10    0.23      4.65         27.36        
11    0.20      5.22         32.12        
12    0.15      6.48         37.66        
13    0.20      15.94         0             
14    0.08      14.58         2.30        
15    0.10      11.63         16.50        
16    0.08      17.50         26.69        
17    0.31      15.54         38.78        
18    0.03      18.41         45.00        
19    0.46      29.51         0             
20    0.20      24.49         6.09        
21    0.36      25.19         17.14        
22    0.43      29.38         25.40        
23    0.56      28.03         34.58        
24    0.25      28.07         35.34        
25    12.69      36.79         0             
26    4.98      37.88         8.21        
27    6.56      38.37         17.75        
28    8.49      38.29         26.70        
29    14.39      38.06         34.31        
30    3.43      38.35         40.97        
31    9.26      47.52         0             
32    3.69      47.90         7.44        
33    4.68      46.60         17.81        
34    5.80      47.16         27.23        
35    8.44      45.98         35.58        
36    3.87      46.69         43.76        
Couple household - both partners flexible
Share Female Working
Hours
1 19.8         0           
2 4.1         7.7        
3 5.9         18.5        
4 14.4         28.3        
5 41.0         37.3        
6 14.8         44.7        
Share Male Working
Hours
1 16.3         0           
2 1.1         6.6        
3 1.4         17.5        
4 3.3         27.3        
5 50.5         38.1        
6 27.4         46.2        
Share Female Working
Hours
1 35.5         0           
2 7.5         8.0        
3 11.9         17.8        
4 13.1         27.0        
5 23.2         33.9        
6 8.8         43.0        
Share Male Working
Hours
1 12.7         0           
2 2.2         5.0        
3 1.5         17.3        
4 1.8         28.1        
5 41.2         37.3        
6 40.5         47.1        
Single households - women
Single households - men
Couple household - women flexible




Notes: The following hours classifications are used: 0, [0 - 12], ]12-20], , ]20-34] , ]34-40] , >40 
Source: SOEP 2003. 
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Table A4.   Relative labour supply effects (in%) 
Women Men 
Working hours as full time 
equivalents 
Working hours as full time 
equivalents    New 
Participation 










  Relative to the non working population between 55-64 
HWS               
Couples 1.80  1.63  1.54  0.09 3.41  3.79 3.79 0.00 
Singles 2.17  2.17  2.17  0.00 3.40  3.40 3.40 0.00 
Total 1.87  1.73  1.66  0.07 3.40  3.69 3.69 0.00 
IWC               
Couples 0.86  0.43  0.51  -0.09 -0.19  -0.38 0.00 -0.38 
Singles 4.34  2.89  2.89  0.00 7.92  6.79 6.79 0.00 
Total 1.53  0.90  0.97  -0.07 1.84  1.42 1.70 -0.28 
EB               
Couples 1.37  1.20  1.11  0.09 1.70  1.89 1.70 0.19 
Singles 1.81  1.81  1.81  0.00 3.96  3.96 3.96 0.00 
 Total  1.46  1.32  1.25  0.07 2.27  2.41 2.27 0.14 
  Relative to the working population between 55-64 
HWS                         
Couples  1.82 1.65 1.56  0.09  1.11 1.24 1.24  0.00 
Singles 0.90  0.90  0.90  0.00 1.58  1.58 1.58 0.00 
 Total  1.48  1.37  1.32  0.05 1.20  1.30 1.30 0.00 
IWC             
Couples 0.87  0.43  0.52  -0.09 -0.06  -0.12 0.00  -0.12 
Singles 1.80  1.20  1.20  0.00 3.68  3.15 3.15 0.00 
 Total  1.21  0.71  0.77  -0.05 0.65  0.50 0.60 -0.10 
EB               
Couples 1.39  1.22  1.13  0.09 0.56  0.62 0.56 0.06 
Singles 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.00 1.84  1.84 1.84 0.00 
 Total  1.15  1.04  0.99  0.05 0.80  0.85 0.80 0.05 
Notes: 
−  Full time equivalents are defined as 40 weekly working hours.  
−  Eligible population are all individuals aged between 55-64 and not working (0.7 million men, and 1.4 
million women). Working population are all individuals aged between 55-64 working (2 million men, and 
1.8 million women).  
Source: SOEP 2003; calculations based on empirical household labour supply model as described in the text. 